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Abstract: Weak governance is a major threat to sustainable development, especially in rural contexts
and within ecosystems of great social and economic value. To understand and compare its arrangement
in the grasslands and wetlands of the Colombian Llanos and the Paraguayan Pantanal, we build
upon the Institutional and Development Framework (IAD) as we explore the role of political,
economic, and social institutions and combine components of the theory of common-pool resources
(CPR) and new institutional economics (NIE). This hybrid conceptualization provides a synthesis of
how top-down hierarchical and market-based systems of community-based and natural resource
management negatively affect sustainable development in both study areas. Our findings suggest
three underlying mechanisms causing a situation of weak governance: centralized (economic and
political) power, the role of central and local governments, and social exclusion. Understanding these
multidimensional contextual mechanisms improves the understanding that institutional structures
supporting arrangements that handle grasslands and wetlands in a sustainable way are needed to
protect the ecosystem’s social and economic values, especially in rural and marginalized contexts.
Keywords: Colombia; common-pool resources; Orinoquia; Llanos Orientales; Pantanal; Paraguay
1. Introduction
Because grasslands and wetlands cover approximately half of the world’s ice-free land area,
comprising about 70% of the world’s agricultural and livestock area, these are important agricultural
resources, especially in areas where people lack food security [1]. Biodiversity and ecosystem services in
grasslands and wetlands are degrading faster than ever before in human history [2,3]. These ecosystems
are at the center of socio-economic conflicts in areas with extensive rural poverty and where people
and economies are highly dependent on natural resources. In South America, grassland and wetland
ecosystems cover 269 million ha [4]. Most (76%) belong to the Cerrados of Brazil, but about 11% (28
million ha) form the Venezuelan Llanos and 6% (16–17 million ha) the Llanos Orientales of Colombia [4,5].
These last areas are seen as a single ecoregion, the Llanos of the Orinoquia. The remaining 7% is the
mosaic of flooded grasslands, savannas, and tropical forests forming the Pantanal, the world’s largest
wetland, stretching across Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay [6]. This wetland area is part of a larger dry
plain of around 100 million ha, known as the Gran Chaco. The Gran Chaco Americano is increasingly
used for livestock grazing and raising crops, with the conversion of natural vegetation accelerating.
Approximately 500 ha per day are deforested in the Paraguayan part of the Gran Chaco Americano [7].
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These grasslands and wetlands play a crucial role in sustainability issues, with social-cultural,
economic, and environmental values. Beyond providing habitat for plants and animals that are adapted
to the unique hydrologic regimes and soil conditions [8,9], they provide important ecosystem services,
including climate regulation and water purification [10–12]. Local communities and indigenous
peoples provide cultural values, embodied in their knowledge about nature conservation and the
sustainability of traditional subsistence systems [13,14].
Although literature on these valuations exist [9,15–19], interdisciplinary and socio-economic
approaches, especially those including discourses on governance in developing countries, are scarce.
Hence, grasslands represent the least understood biome in terms of their true value for sustainable
economic uses and their contribution to human health and well-being through sociocultural services [20,21].
Better understanding social dynamics, including indigenous and traditional values, requires
science-based valuations to leverage narratives on the region’s sustainable development [22–26].
De facto, interdisciplinary research incorporating socio-economic approaches as important determinants
of value is critical for policy making [12,18,26–28].
Regarding our Colombian and Paraguayan cases, only a tiny percentage of the Colombian
Llanos (in the districts of Yopal and Paz de Ariporo) and Paraguayan Pantanal (in the municipality
of Bahía Negra) benefit from legal protection; most land is converted for intensive usage [29–31].
Increasing demand for agricultural commodities drives the conversion of Latin American grasslands
and wetlands, including our case study areas, into cropland, with significant consequences for the
environment, local communities, and democracy [30–32]. In both Colombia and Paraguay, the expansion
of agroindustry, extensive overgrazing, cattle ranching, insecurity of land tenure, unsustainable
infrastructure development, and weak enforcement of environmental laws are the main threats to
culture and biodiversity conservation [29,33,34].
The historical distribution of land and the roots of both eco-regions are starkly reflected in existing
antagonisms between peasants and those elites who control the land: great land owners in Paraguay
and guerrilla and paramilitary groups in Colombia [35–40]. Grasslands and wetlands are unique
sites receiving increasing attention from leading environmental and human rights organizations
(e.g., The German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Amnesty
International, etc.). However, for Paraguay, there is a significant gap in the governance research
literature, especially at the community level [28,29,41]. We draw on the literature regarding participatory
and environmental governance approaches for wetlands in the region [28,42,43]. For Colombia,
although several analyses (e.g., policy papers) concentrate on land use, biodiversity, and renewable
energy [2,34,44], literature analyzing community-based governance models is lacking. Our contribution
tries to fill this gap by investigating local perceptions about economic and political centralization, the role
of governments, and social exclusion. We follow existing literature, discussing weak governance, which
is understood as a widespread system of corruption and unlawful behavior, and how it contributes to
increasing negative consequences, including environmental, socio-economic, and institutional conflicts,
along with social exclusion and poverty [12,26–29].
According to Vatn (2010), three governance structures exist: hierarchies, markets, and community
management [45]. Community-based governance models offer valid tools to resolve conflicts over
a number of issues, including natural resource use and management [46,47]. It also helps empower
a community-based environment, where inclusion and engagement are key factors [48]. In South
America, as a concrete means to promote social and economic welfare, as well as land-ownership rights
and conservation issues, participatory community-based governance is being tested through a number
of voluntary actions including cooperatives, syndicates, and associations [23–25,43,49,50]. This trend
often results in resistance to centralized, top-down model structures, whether political, institutional,
or economic; those only represent the wealthiest elites. Modern governance discourse “signals a
weakening of the state-centric view of power and societal steering that has been problematized by recent
empirical and ideological developments” [51] (pp. 2–4). Post-modern decentring of power is a key
issue in developing countries [52]. Governmental processes concerning South American grasslands and
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wetlands must address socio-economic and environmental changes, power and hierarchical structure
at all scales, and political dynamics, as well as stakeholder engagement schemes [5,28,29,33,44,52–57].
To this end, our focus is on marginalized rural communities because of their vulnerability to weak
governance, as they lack human, political, and financial capacity to protect their rights over land
and natural resource use and management [58]. In this context, our research question seeks to
investigate mechanisms of weak governance and how they are structured in the Colombian Llanos
and Paraguayan Pantanal.
The Umbrella Framework
To contribute to the literature and guide our research, we develop our work under the umbrella of
the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD). IAD is widely employed in research on
community-based management of natural and common resources [59–63]. Because institutions are
the main prescription for repetitive and structured interactions in governance and self-government
environments [60], IAD helps identify key factors for institutional and participatory aspects [63].
It adds the systematic analysis of collective action in relation to the use and management of natural
resources, focusing on institutions. IAD’s core is the “action arena”, comprising the social spaces where
actors interact (the actual situation) and the actors themselves (participants) [64,65]. The “exogenous
variables”, those influencing the action arena, are useful for defining the context (e.g., to understand
what might happen in the action arena), including community attributes, physical attributes, and the
rules in use [66]. Within our research, we adapt the IAD to the needs and criteria of the two main
theoretical frames addressed here: the theory of common-pool resources (CPR) and new institutional
economics (NIE). Both theories seek to analyze institutions, whether political, economic, formal,
or informal, as well as the possible overlaps, aiming to contribute to economic and social development.
The first theory offers much empirical data and a solid frame [64,66–70], because scholars are
increasingly studying the governing of natural resources by a community or a number of individuals.
CPR helps us understand the role of communities and their relations with ecosystems. A simple
assumption of a successful CPR model is to maintain a common resource for an extended time without
outside intervention [67]. Hence, the possibility of overexploitation is resolved when there is an ‘increase
in the capacities of participants to change coercive rules of the entire game’ [71] (pp. 263–277). Similarly,
as claimed by Saunders (2014), ‘CPR theory tends to conceptualise heterogeneous communities as
autonomous “rational resource users” with fixed identities and a common purpose’ [70] (pp. 649–666).
This is how we address the theory of CPR: over time, societies develop institutional mechanisms,
whether formal or informal, whether legal or rooted in tradition, and customs that efficiently and
successfully manage natural resources.
The second theory reflects an economic approach that is relevant in the rules (or institutions)
of participants when they are interdependent. Most studies regard the theory of institutional
economics [72–75] as a step beyond neoclassical economics because it studies the structure of property
rights. As reinforced by Ollila (2009), this theoretical approach,
“Analyses whose costs are taken into account in the economic calculus and what market
measures can be considered as efficient outcomes. For example, what is the relation between
efficiency and social acceptance? The market may produce multiple “efficient” outcomes
and, thus, one must decide what kind of a state of a market is preferable.” [76] (pp. 21–26)
Therefore, efficiency is determined by the institutional set (property rights). A further development
of this concept is new institutional economics (NIE), which focuses on the role that culture, legal systems,
political institutions, and other instances have on economic development. Yet, the meaning of institutions
remains as “the rules of the game” while actors are the “players of the game”. As Alston et al. (1996)
and North (2005) conceptualize, institutions are informal rules and limitations (sanctions, taboos,
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), as well as formal rules (constitutions, laws, property
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rights) [77,78]. Thus, within the lens of economic and social development, mechanisms underlying
weak governance are explained, classified, and analyzed using NIE.
2. Methodology
2.1. Case Study Descriptions
Due to the aforementioned socio-ecological similarities, we focus on the Department of Casanare
in the Colombian Llanos (in the districts of Yopal and Paz de Ariporo) and the Department of Alto
Paraguay in the Paraguayan Pantanal (in the municipality of Bahía Negra) (Figure 1). Agricultural
production is the principle threat to the savannahs and grasslands in both areas, while land use
and management rarely includes ecological and social criteria that safeguard natural ecosystems,
biodiversity, and carbon stocks. Land use and the ongoing transformation of natural ecosystems
negatively affect local and community-based governance structures.
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contributors and the GIS User Com unity.
2.2. Methodological Procedures
We use a mixed methods approach across three methodological phases: (A) exploratory
research including an international literature review and non-structured interviews with 10 key
informants; (B) field-based studies consisting of an online survey of 32 regional experts; and (C)
a set of semi-structured interviews based on the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF) [79],
involving 102 local participants. Figure 2 displays the three steps of the procedure. Data were
gathered from 144 people, including informants, regional experts, and local participants. The entire
methodology draws upon the IAD framework, including contextual perspectives (attributes of
community, attributes of physical world rules-in-use) throughout Phases A, B, and C. Figure 3 shows
the adapted IAD framework.
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and environmental issues in the case study areas (see Appendix A). Criteria for the Phase B study-sample
comprised: presence (e.g., minimum 5 years) of work in the areas of study; professional career
(e.g., working position/responsibilities) and relevance to the areas of study; and educational degree
(e.g., undergraduate/post-graduate). In total, 45 experts were identified, of which 32 responded to
the survey. The sample comprised diverse actors and knowledge areas, covering the complexity of
our research problem. Participants belonged to academia (e.g., national universities), civil society
(e.g., NGOs (Non-governmental organizations), associations etc.), the private sector (e.g., private
companies present in the areas), and the public sector (central, regional, and local institutions).
We created sub-categories corresponding to the characteristics and indicators for each category,
presented in Table 1. Questions for experts related to four topics: (1) the use and management of
natural resources and their relation to land distribution; (2) the presence of Ostrom’s eight principles of
managing common-pool resources and their relation with present formal and informal boundaries
reflecting the perceived power relations [56]; (3) conjectures related to a diverse range of forms of
institutions in the areas of study; and (4) existing models of community-based sustainability within the
agenda of economic models. Under Topic 1, we offered a list of potential threats to the specific ecoregion
(e.g., misuse of natural resources, over-exploitation, global warming, population growth, urbanization,
etc.), asking experts to pick one option. Topic 2 comprised tick boxes with yes/no options for each of
Ostrom’s eight principles. We also added four open questions about rules (both formal and informal),
decision making processes, law implementation, and the current status of information and education
about natural resources. Under Topic 3, we added two lists of questions. In the first, experts picked
one main possible constraint for governing natural resources from a list (e.g., corruption, impunity,
centralized natural resource management, lack of human and financial capacity of local governments,
etc.). For the second, experts were asked to pick the two most relevant social interactions in the regions
(e.g., economic exchange, voter-politician relations, inter-ethnic conflicts, and/or cooperation, etc.).
Topic 4 comprised a single tick box (yes/no) about existing cases of communities managing natural
resources. If the answer was yes, they were asked to choose an economic model (either top-down
or bottom-up). If no, there were four open questions about social relations (e.g., corporations/social
marginalization, social welfare/sustainable development, local interests/national and local scales,
intra-sectorial relations/conflicts, gender equality/social exclusion) that sought relevant considerations.
In Phase B, we designed and implemented a questionnaire of 45 questions, using the sections of
characteristic and indicators (Table 1). From the online questionnaire, we extracted percentages for
each characteristic and indicator to determine the most relevant perceptions of the local experts.
Phase C is based on the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF) [79]. This tool allows us
to systematize our field work analysis. With its broad adaptability and applicability on the ground,
GAF allows researchers to describe socio-ecological processes within specific and unique contexts [81–83].
GAF focuses on social interactions within which actors/participants make decisions regarding a
collective problem, thereby creating and reinforcing social norms or institutions [79]. It comprises five
analytical tools: problems, actors, social norms, processes, and nodal points. Field study constraints
limited us to focusing on two: problems and social norms (Figure 4). The category actors were
initially covered by a stakeholder identification and mapping based on the analysis for this research.
Time constraints for our field study prevented us from developing an analysis of processes and nodal
points. The GAF survey was clustered in two blocks: questions to understand perceived shared
problems, a condition to be improved upon (collective problems); and questions highlighting the
perceived institutions or practices to preserve (social norms). Both sets of questions were formulated
as lists, thus providing respondents the opportunity to rank suggested categories from most to
least relevant.
In the Colombian Department of Casanare (the districts of Yopal and Paz de Ariporo),
we interviewed 50 individual respondents, representing 17 groups, including civil society (9 groups),
the public sector (5 groups), and the private sector (3 groups). Each interview was authorized and
transcribed, lasting between one and three hours. In Paraguay, we analyzed the municipality of Bahía
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Negra in the Department of Alto Paraguay, interviewing 52 people, representing 15 groups across three
societal sectors: the public sector (3 groups), the private sector (5 groups), and civil society (7 groups)
(see Appendix A). A field diary recorded qualitative data and notes on the behaviors and interactions
of all actors involved in this study [84,85].
Table 1. Characteristic and indicators of common-pool resources (CPR) and the new institutional
economics (NIE) in the context of the four topics (1, 2, 3, 4).
CPR NIE
1. Use and management of natural resources
If, and how, experts address issues about managing
resources (common pool) such as grazing land,
grasslands, wetlands, and forests.
Roots and significance of land distribution (property
rights) according to experts’ perception (updated data
from official sources is missing).
2. Common pool resources
If, and how, local and rural communities respond to
Ostrom’s eight principles for managing Commons:
Expert’s perception of institutions and power relations in
the area (hierarchy):
1. Define clear group boundaries (effective
exclusion of external unentitled parties).
2. Match rules governing use of common goods to
local needs and conditions.
3. Ensure that those affected by the rules can
participate in modifying the rules.
• Informal boundaries (sanctions, taboos, customs,
traditions, and codes of conduct)
4. Make sure the rule-making rights of community
members are respected by outside authorities.
5. Develop a system, carried out by community
members, for monitoring members’ behavior.
6. Use graduated sanctions for rule violators.
• Formal boundaries (constitutions, laws,
property rights).
7. Provide accessible, low-cost means for
dispute resolution.
8. Build responsibility for governing the common
resource in nested tiers from the lowest level up
to the entire interconnected system.
3. Institutions
Formal/informal/legal/illegal institutions managing natural resources.
4. Cases
Specific cases of communities managing natural
resources directly and in which forms.
Economic models (export-market asset) in relation to
community-based rules:
1. Given top-down from central governmental bodies.
2. Created locally (formal/informal settings).
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3. Results
The results follow the same structure of the two main methodological Phases (B and C) for
each case study. Results of Phase A served to develop a better contextual understanding. A total of
144 people (informants, experts, and participants), representing many institutions, participated.
3.1. Colombian Llanos
3.1.1. Online Survey in Colombia (Phase B)
Fifteen experts from Colombia responded fully to the online questionnaire (Phase B).
The respondents were diverse: 40% from academia, 26% public sector, 26% non-governmental
organizations, and 8% the private sector. Figure 5 summarizes relevant findings in percentages and
corresponding number of persons, based on local expert perceptions.
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Regarding the use and management of natural resources in comparison to land distribution
(Topic 1 in Figure 5), more than 80% of experts (12) perceive that the misuse of natural resources,
understood as excessive and destructive use, is the most relevant threat in the Colombian region of
the Llanos Orientales. For 70% of respondents, the productive sector is seen as the most detached
from sustainably using natural resources, because its main priorities are intensifying productivity and
generating profits. Productive sector stakeholders are not only perceived as the main law violators
(60%, 9 experts), in terms of non-compliance with current environmental laws, but also as the main
drivers of land exploitation, including deforestation (80%, 12 experts).
For common pool resources and the role of hierarchy (Topic 2 in Table 1), none of Ostrom’s
eight principles for managing resources are observed. Respondents report a lack of inclusive and
effective community-based governance models. Four core issues regarding formal/informal boundaries
(power relations) compromise the existence (applicability/implementation) of Ostrom’s eight principles.
The first is that 60% of experts (9) agree that informal rules (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions,
and codes of conduct) prevail over formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Secondly,
the remoteness of the region and the lack of decentralization of powers, particularly in relation
to natural resource management and use, mean that local and rural communities are excluded
from decision making processes; a claim supported by 90% of experts (13). The third factor, with
60% of experts agreeing (9), is poor implementation of laws, mostly due to weak local institutions
(e.g., law enforcement). Finally, 70% of experts (10) agree that the lack of information and education
about the sustainable use and management of natural resources is an informal boundary constraining
ecological alternatives.
Institutional perceptions (Table 1, Topic 3) suggest that corruption is the most relevant issue with
regard to social inclusion in the use and management of natural resources; with 80% of experts (12)
agreeing. Additionally, main social interactions are represented by economic exchange (50%, 7 experts)
and by voter-politician relations (40%, 6 experts). With regard to the role of existing community-based
governance models (Topic 4 in Table 1), experts could not identify any specific cases of local and rural
communities managing natural resources. Yet, they raised two important considerations. First, 90% of
experts (13) agree that the interests of agro-industrial and extractives companies are major drivers
of social instability and marginalization. Second, 50% of experts (7) agree that the lack of projects
relating to social welfare and sustainable development is a limitation for the future development of
community-based governance models.
3.1.2. GAF Colombia (Phase C)
GAF survey results are presented in Figure 6. Extractive activities, such as exploiting hydrocarbons
(especially oil) and monoculture expansions (specifically, rice) are the two highest ranked collective
problems, as perceived by the respondents. The critical importance of traditional livestock is
represented as the main social norm in the region. Additionally, Community Action Boards (CAB) are
ranked as an important social norm affecting community conduct. CAB are voluntary and participatory
schemes of legal-norm-related action where communities can discuss and find solutions to collective
problems. Not only are they civic and non-profit mechanisms, they are also community based
organizations for social management.
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3.2. Paraguayan Pantanal
3.2.1. Online Survey in Paraguay (Phase B)
Seventeen Paraguayan experts completed the online questionnaire, representing the public sector
(35%), NGOs (35%), 18% academia (18%), the private sector (6%), and the media (6%). Figure 7
summarizes the relevant findings, in percentages and corresponding number of persons, based on the
perceptions of local experts.
Expert perception of land use and management of natural resources (Topic 1 in Figure 7) shows that
over-exploitation of natural resources in the Paraguayan Pantanal is the main threat to the ecosystem
(80%, 13+). Both private and public sectors are responsible (40% of agreement rate, 6+ experts).
The legacy of Paraguayan history, specifically Stroessner’s dictatorship (1954 to 1989), still affects
land-reparation and land-distribution issues, among other things. Moreover, not only do experts
regard the private sector as the main law violator in the region, but also as the main driver of natural
resource exploitation (50% and 50% agreement rate, 8 and 8 experts, respectively).
With respect to common pool resources and the role of hierarchy (Topic 2 in Figure 7), experts could
not relate any of Ostrom’s principles to present experiences or cases on the ground. However, important
considerations were raised and agreed upon. For instance, 60% of experts (10) agreed that informal rules
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) prevail over formal rules (constitutions,
laws, property rights). Further, 80% of experts (13+) agreed that the region’s remoteness and a lack
of power decentralization, mainly in relation to natural resource management and use, mean that
local and rural communities are excluded from decision making processes. An additional issue is
the poor implementation of laws, mostly due to weak institutions (e.g., law enforcement) at the local
level; something that 60% of experts (10) agreed upon. Lastly, 80% of experts (13+) agreed that the lack
of information and education about the sustainable use and management of natural resources is an
informal boundary constraining ecological alternatives.
Regarding institutional perceptions in the area (Figure 7, Topic 3), more than 70% of the experts (11+)
found that impunity, understood as exemption from punishment or fines, is a central rule-of-the-game.
Consequently, the two most perceived social interactions are economic exchange and voter-politician
relations; with experts agreeing 60% (10) and 20% (3) of the time, respectively. Regarding existing
practices of community-based governance models (Topic 4 in Figure 7), experts did not find any cases of
local and rural communities managing natural resources. Nevertheless, they raised and agreed on two
pertinent reflections. First, half the experts agreed that representation of local and indigenous interests
at all scales, from the local to international, is low. Second, 90% of experts (15) agreed that intra-sectorial
conflicts also emerge from the lack of participatory and community-based governance models.
3.2.2. GAF Paraguay (Phase C)
GAF survey results for Paraguay are presented in Figure 8. Land-grabbing, locally understood
as a contentious issue surrounding large-scale land acquisition/speculation, is perceived as the main
collective problem. Social norms show that sectorial representation and inclusion (in the forms of
community roundtables and indigenous association) are two key factors through which problems are
addressed and actions taken.
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4. Discussion
Relations between political, economic, and social institutions dealing with environmental issues,
challenges, and changes fall under the IAD framework (Figure 9). Issues around the use and management
of natural resources are regarded as political ecological problems [86,87]. The following discussion
tackles the complexity of economic and political centralization, the role of governments, and social
exclusion as causes of weak governance.
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4.1. Comparative Analysis: Governance in Colombia and Paraguay
In both Colombia and Paraguay, the productive sector (extractive activities, agroindustry, etc.) is
predominantly considered responsible for the misuse (Colombia) and over-exploitation (Paraguay)
of natural resources (Figures 5 and 7). All groups involved, directly or indirectly, in the use and
management of natural resources (e.g., private and productive sector, public sector, rural and indigenous
communities, etc.) are related hierarchically, ultimately with the productive sector (e.g., often represented
by financial and foreign investments) on top, the main ruler of the game [29]. The exploitation of
hydrocarbons, monoculture expansion (oil and rice in Colombia), and land grabbing (Paraguay) are the
main collective problems addressed in the context of weak governance (Figures 6 and 8). These occur
due to the present neoliberal economic model under which productive sectors use their political and
economic power to pursue market-driven interests [88].
Thus, this accumulation mode (often unregulated) of natural resources for international export
might be the main constraint to sustainable alternatives. Regional literature suggests extractive
interventions are an increasingly important development strategy and policy throughout Latin
America [42,54,55,89]. Economists and analysts argue how “extractivism” is an evolution of the
development path chosen by most South American countries, prioritizing extraction and exploitation
of natural wealth for global markets [55]. In both Colombia and Paraguay, land distribution and land
planning are strategic means for power relations and negotiations. Alongside neoliberal perspectives,
extractivism prefers external markets to local ones; it encourages wealth concentration, marginalizing
equitable distribution of the same wealth [55]. In one market-oriented extractive economic model, within
the political and productive-sector agenda, natural resources are managed under a hierarchical structure
where power-relations and interferences occur [88]. Historically, socio-ecological and distributive
conflicts related to extractivism have been occurring for centuries in both rural Colombia and
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Paraguay [37]. Equity in the distribution of goods and services is not an option when the ‘rules of
the game’ are designed by those institutions, whether formal or informal, holding greater economic
assets and political influence. Instead, literature on good governance of natural resources reaffirms the
importance of wide involvement, representation of diverse interests, legitimacy, and responsiveness to
both local customs and formal legal systems [90].
4.1.1. Centralization
In addition, the wide expanses and remoteness of the areas are key obstacles inhibiting transparency
measures (e.g., monitoring) and formal boundaries (e.g., law enforcement and control). Nevertheless,
policy reforms over land use and land distribution in both Colombia and Paraguay show, not just trends
toward privatization, but also the delegation of service provisions to the private sector and, at times,
civil society actors [57]. The results reflect this, although the presence of the state, even in formal forms
of delegation of action and powers, is not perceived as a reality; instead it generates informal patterns
regarding the use and management of natural resources. Within formal institutions and settings,
centralized and top-down models, supported by neoliberal and extractive systems, exacerbate the
marginalization of local governments and institutions (e.g., lack of financial and human support, etc.).
In such contexts, alternatives ensuring public service provision by community members, while demanding
support from the state to facilitate the conditions for such effort, are compromised [56,62]. Both the
lack of trust in and within public institutions and the lack of standards for democratic governance
may negatively affect the fairness of decision making processes [90]. Thus, the mechanism of power
centralization and authority in the hands of private economic actors, especially in terms of economic
impacts, underlies weak governance [91].
4.1.2. Role of Governments
Under the NIE lens, property rights models are economic property rights, not legal property
rights (enforced by the government). These rights aim to consume, either directly or indirectly through
exchange or transactions, the goods and service of the resources by including rights for resource usage,
rights to earn income from it, and rights to transfer ownership rights [92,93]. Economic property rights
inherently represent institutions that benefit from the weak resource management of public institutions
and, particularly, the unclear structures of ownership, monitoring, and control (e.g., law compliance
etc.). These can foster informal institutions, such as corruption (Colombia) and impunity (Paraguay)
that cause social and environmental conflicts. Under this scenario, natural resource struggles require a
clear definition of group boundaries to be solved [94]. However, the nebulousness of property rights,
due to different circumstances (e.g., armed conflict, foreign interferences, and financial speculations,
etc.), is disastrous for natural resources [55]. As these cases show, unsuccessful efforts to govern and
manage natural resources appear linked to hierarchical organizational structures. Decision-making
processes and accountability can represent a major threat to democratic processes when it excludes
local perspectives, thus increasing institutional tensions throughout [90], (Hare et al., 2018). Where the
main user obtains control through force (e.g., economic, rooted into informal institutions, etc.), due to
the other groups’ inability or impossibility (e.g., public institutions, local and rural communities etc.)
to govern natural resources, conflicts over the inequity of products or raw materials from natural
resources arise [94]. Thus, the same resources are exposed and subject to misuse and (unsustainable)
exploitation unless formal or informal limits are enforced [68]. As Stebek (2011) notes, there is no
automatic association of natural resources with any property regime type [94]. Further, common
property arrangements are essentially share-contracts [92] and, as such, face problems of opportunistic
behavior and moral hazard. Without solid formal institutions present on the ground, as well as a
shift away from neo-liberal and extractivist approaches, the role of central and local governments
(how it functions) causes weak governance. By prioritizing the interests of economic powers over
those of rural communities, governments are unwilling or unable to fully assume their responsibilities,
especially with regard to reducing inequalities over the use and management of natural resources [95].
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4.1.3. Social Exclusion
Further, from the community perspective, rural and indigenous groups are typically left behind
and marginalized (see “evaluative criteria”, Figure 9). Thus, the voices of the most vulnerable citizens
are unheard when there are conflicts balancing land-use between the exploitation and provision
of natural resources with local needs and conditions. Hence, social inclusion in managing natural
resources and creating better models for governance is a mirage and, in most cases, viewed through the
prism of informal or illegal economic exchange and voter-politician relations. Nevertheless, in order to
facilitate and encourage inclusive and collective actions for common purposes, local group members
suggest a stronger focus on those assets intrinsic to social relations, such as trust and networks of
association representing local needs and groups within the ‘action arena’ (e.g., CAB or indigenous
associations) [65]. Even if public trust practices vary across cultures and over time, and when local laws
and norms do not directly embody specific standards for democratic governance, they are likely to be
situated within governance systems in which good governance applies at some level [90]. In the social
sciences, there is a vast amount of literature on pluralistic approaches in the exercise of politics and
governance [63,96–101]. For instance, a higher degree of voluntary participation in movements and
association results in better networks of relationships among communities. Likewise, greater inclusion
in problem-solving strategies alongside the government allows society to function more efficiently.
Smaller community networks increase the need to rely on imposing and authoritative controls, either
political or economic [101]. Hence, based on our Colombian and Paraguayan cases, social exclusion
is an additional mechanism of weak governance [102]. As Beall (2002) argues, “From a neoliberal
perspective, social exclusion can be seen as an unfortunate but inevitable side effect of global economic
realignment”, [103] (pp. 43–44).
In both regions, hierarchical and market-based structures prevail over community management.
However, community management of natural resources between government actors and local resource
users is promising for conservation and local development [104,105]. While this is critical in both cases,
the underlying tenure rights and land concentration only allows for changes in management if the
government initiates the changes.
As for future recommendations, we suggest:
• In-depth analysis of land-use using social representation studies that leverage our results when
including the mechanisms of weak governance discussed;
• Central and local institutions in Colombia and Paraguay should formulate cross-cutting groups to
manage natural resources, building capacity for inclusive forms of governance (principles and
frameworks through decentralization of functions and power to locals);
• Civil society should implement projects focusing on need-based development for better
management of natural resources as well as poverty alleviation and the reduction of
socio-economic inequality.
4.2. Limitations
There are limitations to these results. (1) In the online survey (Phase B) the sample size might not be
sufficient (32 respondents) and does not exhaustively cover private sector expertise. The 13 experts who
did not complete the survey could have added specific knowledge about agricultural and extractive
industries. However, it was challenging to find regional experts willing to participate to our research.
(2) In the GAF survey, the research suffers from the quality of the sample composition. Within the private
and productive sectors, those who participated belonged to the subsistence and livestock agricultural
sector. None of the participants represented the agricultural or extractive industries (e.g., monoculture,
hydrocarbons, etc.); heterogeneity in the results may have resulted. Further, the degree to which the
research tends to generalize is limited: By implementing only two of the five GAF analytical tools
(Phase B) and by having collected subjective perceptions (Phase C), the replicability of this study may
be affected. Thus, the results might not translate or be transferrable to a broader context. However,
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based on our research scope (i.e., perception on mechanisms of weak governance), we present cases
where existing research is scarce.
5. Conclusions
The grasslands and wetlands of Colombia and Paraguay face weak governance, in both its
institutional and community-based contexts. This work hybrid conceptualization provided a synthesis
of how top-down hierarchical and market-based systems of community-based and natural resource
management negatively affect sustainable development in both study areas. Three mechanisms causing
weak governance were identified: the centralized economic and political power, the role of central and
local governments, and social exclusion.
These findings should be seen in the light of the following conceptual contributions. First,
they underpin the knowledge that weak governance encourages social inequalities and the erosion of
local cultures, with destabilizing consequences [91]. Second, they are often in relation to environmental
degradation, including in national parks and other protected areas, as well as illegal land grabbing
and land tenure speculations. Third, the mechanisms of weak governance may thrive under the
following circumstances: (i) where formal laws are complex, incoherent, or outdated; (ii) where
informal institutions, such as corruption or impunity, are directly linked to socio-environmental
conflicts; (iii) where decision making and budgeting processes are centralized in urban areas, having
direct impacts on law enforcement and monitoring at the local level; (iv) where weak property regimes
of land tenure, land distribution, and land planning are in place; and (v) where multi-level exclusion
(social status, gender, ethnicity, education, etc.) exists.
Instead, good governance should ensure human and land rights and protect natural resources,
while also promoting socially and economically sustainable development [58,81,106]. Therefore,
institutional structures supporting arrangements that handle grasslands and wetlands in a sustainable
way are needed to protect the ecosystem’s social and economic values, especially in rural and
marginalized contexts.
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Appendix A
Table A1. List of institutions involved in the field-based studies (online survey, Phase B).
Colombia Paraguay
1. Universidad de los Llanos
1. Green Solutions S.A.
2. Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock—Programa
Nacional Fomento Agropecuario
2. Universidad del Rosario
3. Secretary of the Environment—SEAM
4. National Secretariat for Housing and
Habitat—SENAVITAT
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Colombia Paraguay
3. Universidad de los Andes 5. Technical Secretariat for Economic and SocialDevelopment Planning—STP
4. Universidad de los Andes 6. Forestry Institute—INFONA
5. Universidad Nacional de Colombia 7. Minister of Foreign Affairs—Coordination of theEnvironmental Affairs Unit
6. International left for Tropical Agriculture—CIAT 8. Paraguay Selvaje
7. Fundación Centro para la Investigación en Sistemas
Sostenibles de Producción Agropecuaria—CIPAV 9. Centro de Pesquisa do Pantanal—CPP
8. Wildlife Conservation Society Colombia—WCS 10. Solidaridad Paraguay
9. Corporinoquia Colombia 11. Fundación para el Desarrollo Sustentable en lasAméricas del Norte y del Sur
10. Corporación Para El Desarrollo Sostenible Del Área
De Manejo Especial De La Macarena—Cormacarena
12. Paraguay Magazine
11. Organización Internacional para las Migraciones
(OIM)
13. Program of Support For Volunteers In
Protected Areas—PAVAP
12. El Orinoco Se Adapta 14. National University of Asunción
13. World Wildlife Fund—WWF Colombia 15. Guyra Paraguay
14. Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y
Estudios Ambientales—IDEAM 16. Wildlife Conservation Society Paraguay—WCS
15. Asociación de apoyo al Desarrollo—APOYAR 17. World Wildlife Fund—WWF Paraguay
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